Tuesday, June 10, 2014

Review of compare discount brokers::How to Choose the Best Investment Broker







Review of compare discount brokers::How to Choose the Best Investment Broker








Claud               Cockburn,               writing               for               the               "Times               of               London"               from               New-York,               described               the               irrational               exuberance               that               gripped               the               nation               just               prior               to               the               Great               Depression.

As               Europe               wallowed               in               post-war               malaise,               America               seemed               to               have               discovered               a               new               economy,               the               secret               of               uninterrupted               growth               and               prosperity,               the               fount               of               transforming               technology:               "The               atmosphere               of               the               great               boom               was               savagely               exciting,               but               there               were               times               when               a               person               with               my               European               background               felt               alarmingly               lonely.

He               would               have               liked               to               believe,               as               these               people               believed,               in               the               eternal               upswing               of               the               big               bull               market               or               else               to               meet               just               one               person               with               whom               he               might               discuss               some               general               doubts               without               being               regarded               as               an               imbecile               or               a               person               of               deliberately               evil               intent               -               some               kind               of               anarchist,               perhaps."
               The               greatest               analysts               with               the               most               impeccable               credentials               and               track               records               failed               to               predict               the               forthcoming               crash               and               the               unprecedented               economic               depression               that               followed               it.

Irving               Fisher,               a               preeminent               economist,               who,               according               to               his               biographer-son,               Irving               Norton               Fisher,               lost               the               equivalent               of               $140               million               in               today's               money               in               the               crash,               made               a               series               of               soothing               predictions.

On               October               22               he               uttered               these               avuncular               statements:               "Quotations               have               not               caught               up               with               real               values               as               yet               ...

(There               is)               no               cause               for               a               slump               ...

The               market               has               not               been               inflated               but               merely               readjusted..."
               Even               as               the               market               convulsed               on               Black               Thursday,               October               24,               1929               and               on               Black               Tuesday,               October               29               -               the               New               York               Times               wrote:               "Rally               at               close               cheers               brokers,               bankers               optimistic".
               In               an               editorial               on               October               26,               it               blasted               rabid               speculators               and               compliant               analysts:               "We               shall               hear               considerably               less               in               the               future               of               those               newly               invented               conceptions               of               finance               which               revised               the               principles               of               political               economy               with               a               view               solely               to               fitting               the               stock               market's               vagaries.''               But               it               ended               thus:               "(The               Federal               Reserve               has)               insured               the               soundness               of               the               business               situation               when               the               speculative               markets               went               on               the               rocks.''
               Compare               this               to               Alan               Greenspan               Congressional               testimony               this               summer:               "While               bubbles               that               burst               are               scarcely               benign,               the               consequences               need               not               be               catastrophic               for               the               economy               ...

(The               Depression               was               brought               on               by)               ensuing               failures               of               policy."
               Investors,               their               equity               leveraged               with               bank               and               broker               loans,               crowded               into               stocks               of               exciting               "new               technologies",               such               as               the               radio               and               mass               electrification.

The               bull               market               -               especially               in               issues               of               public               utilities               -               was               fueled               by               "mergers,               new               groupings,               combinations               and               good               earnings"               and               by               corporate               purchasing               for               "employee               stock               funds".
               Cautionary               voices               -               such               as               Paul               Warburg,               the               influential               banker,               Roger               Babson,               the               "Prophet               of               Loss"               and               Alexander               Noyes,               the               eternal               Cassandra               from               the               New               York               Times               -               were               derided.

The               number               of               brokerage               accounts               doubled               between               March               1927               and               March               1929.
               When               the               market               corrected               by               8               percent               between               March               18-27               -               following               a               Fed               induced               credit               crunch               and               a               series               of               mysterious               closed-door               sessions               of               the               Fed's               board               -               bankers               rushed               in.

The               New               York               Times               reported:               "Responsible               bankers               agree               that               stocks               should               now               be               supported,               having               reached               a               level               that               makes               them               attractive.''               By               August,               the               market               was               up               35               percent               on               its               March               lows.

But               it               reached               a               peak               on               September               3               and               it               was               downhill               since               then.
               On               October               19,               five               days               before               "Black               Thursday",               Business               Week               published               this               sanguine               prognosis:
               "Now,               of               course,               the               crucial               weaknesses               of               such               periods               -               price               inflation,               heavy               inventories,               over-extension               of               commercial               credit               -               are               totally               absent.

The               security               market               seems               to               be               suffering               only               an               attack               of               stock               indigestion...

There               is               additional               reassurance               in               the               fact               that,               should               business               show               any               further               signs               of               fatigue,               the               banking               system               is               in               a               good               position               now               to               administer               any               needed               credit               tonic               from               its               excellent               Reserve               supply."
               The               crash               unfolded               gradually.

Black               Thursday               actually               ended               with               an               inspiring               rally.

Friday               and               Saturday               -               trading               ceased               only               on               Sundays               -               witnessed               an               upswing               followed               by               mild               profit               taking.

The               market               dropped               12.8               percent               on               Monday,               with               Winston               Churchill               watching               from               the               visitors'               gallery               -               incurring               a               loss               of               $10-14               billion.
               The               Wall               Street               Journal               warned               naive               investors:
               "Many               are               looking               for               technical               corrective               reactions               from               time               to               time,               but               do               not               expect               these               to               disturb               the               upward               trend               for               any               prolonged               period."
               The               market               plummeted               another               11.7               percent               the               next               day               -               though               trading               ended               with               an               impressive               rally               from               the               lows.

October               31               was               a               good               day               with               a               "vigorous,               buoyant               rally               from               bell               to               bell".

Even               Rockefeller               joined               the               myriad               buyers.

Shares               soared.

It               seemed               that               the               worst               was               over.
               The               New               York               Times               was               optimistic:
               "It               is               thought               that               stocks               will               become               stabilized               at               their               actual               worth               levels,               some               higher               and               some               lower               than               the               present               ones,               and               that               the               selling               prices               will               be               guided               in               the               immediate               future               by               the               worth               of               each               particular               security,               based               on               its               dividend               record,               earnings               ability               and               prospects.

Little               is               heard               in               Wall               Street               these               days               about               'putting               stocks               up."
               But               it               was               not               long               before               irate               customers               began               blaming               their               stupendous               losses               on               advice               they               received               from               their               brokers.

Alec               Wilder,               a               songwriter               in               New               York               in               1929,               interviewed               by               Stud               Terkel               in               "Hard               Times"               four               decades               later,               described               this               typical               exchange               with               his               money               manager:
               "I               knew               something               was               terribly               wrong               because               I               heard               bellboys,               everybody,               talking               about               the               stock               market.

About               six               weeks               before               the               Wall               Street               Crash,               I               persuaded               my               mother               in               Rochester               to               let               me               talk               to               our               family               adviser.

I               wanted               to               sell               stock               which               had               been               left               me               by               my               father.

He               got               very               sentimental:               'Oh               your               father               wouldn't               have               liked               you               to               do               that.'               He               was               so               persuasive,               I               said               O.K.

I               could               have               sold               it               for               $160,000.

Four               years               later,               I               sold               it               for               $4,000."
               Exhausted               and               numb               from               days               of               hectic               trading               and               back               office               operations,               the               brokerage               houses               pressured               the               stock               exchange               to               declare               a               two               day               trading               holiday.

Exchanges               around               North               America               followed               suit.
               At               first,               the               Fed               refused               to               reduce               the               discount               rate.

"(There)               was               no               change               in               financial               conditions               which               the               board               thought               called               for               its               action."               -               though               it               did               inject               liquidity               into               the               money               market               by               purchasing               government               bonds.

Then,               it               partially               succumbed               and               reduced               the               New               York               discount               rate,               which,               curiously,               was               1               percent               above               the               other               Fed               districts               -               by               1               percent.

This               was               too               little               and               too               late.

The               market               never               recovered               after               November               1.

Despite               further               reductions               in               the               discount               rate               to               4               percent,               it               shed               a               whopping               89               percent               in               nominal               terms               when               it               hit               bottom               three               years               later.
               Everyone               was               duped.

The               rich               were               impoverished               overnight.

Small               time               margin               traders               -               the               forerunners               of               today's               day               traders               -               lost               their               shirts               and               much               else               besides.

The               New               York               Times:
               "Yesterday's               market               crash               was               one               which               largely               affected               rich               men,               institutions,               investment               trusts               and               others               who               participate               in               the               market               on               a               broad               and               intelligent               scale.

It               was               not               the               margin               traders               who               were               caught               in               the               rush               to               sell,               but               the               rich               men               of               the               country               who               are               able               to               swing               blocks               of               5,000,               10,000,               up               to               100,000               shares               of               high-priced               stocks.

They               went               overboard               with               no               more               consideration               than               the               little               trader               who               was               swept               out               on               the               first               day               of               the               market's               upheaval,               whose               prices,               even               at               their               lowest               of               last               Thursday,               now               look               high               by               comparison               ...

To               most               of               those               who               have               been               in               the               market               it               is               all               the               more               awe-inspiring               because               their               financial               history               is               limited               to               bull               markets."
               Overseas               -               mainly               European               -               selling               was               an               important               factor.

Some               conspiracy               theorists,               such               as               Webster               Tarpley               in               his               "British               Financial               Warfare",               supported               by               contemporary               reporting               by               the               likes               of               "The               Economist",               went               as               far               as               writing:
               "When               this               Wall               Street               Bubble               had               reached               gargantuan               proportions               in               the               autumn               of               1929,               (Lord)               Montagu               Norman               (governor               of               the               Bank               of               England               1920-1944)               sharply               (upped)               the               British               bank               rate,               repatriating               British               hot               money,               and               pulling               the               rug               out               from               under               the               Wall               Street               speculators,               thus               deliberately               and               consciously               imploding               the               US               markets.

This               caused               a               violent               depression               in               the               United               States               and               some               other               countries,               with               the               collapse               of               financial               markets               and               the               contraction               of               production               and               employment.

In               1929,               Norman               engineered               a               collapse               by               puncturing               the               bubble."
               The               crash               was,               in               large               part,               a               reaction               to               a               sharp               reversal,               starting               in               1928,               of               the               reflationary,               "cheap               money",               policies               of               the               Fed               intended,               as               Adolph               Miller               of               the               Fed's               Board               of               Governors               told               a               Senate               committee,               "to               bring               down               money               rates,               the               call               rate               among               them,               because               of               the               international               importance               the               call               rate               had               come               to               acquire.

The               purpose               was               to               start               an               outflow               of               gold               -               to               reverse               the               previous               inflow               of               gold               into               this               country               (back               to               Britain)."               But               the               Fed               had               already               lost               control               of               the               speculative               rush.
               The               crash               of               1929               was               not               without               its               Enrons               and               World.com's.

Clarence               Hatry               and               his               associates               admitted               to               forging               the               accounts               of               their               investment               group               to               show               a               fake               net               worth               of               $24               million               British               pounds               -               rather               than               the               true               picture               of               19               billion               in               liabilities.

This               led               to               forced               liquidation               of               Wall               Street               positions               by               harried               British               financiers.
               The               collapse               of               Middle               West               Utilities,               run               by               the               energy               tycoon,               Samuel               Insull,               exposed               a               web               of               offshore               holding               companies               whose               only               purpose               was               to               hide               losses               and               disguise               leverage.

The               former               president               of               NYSE,               Richard               Whitney               was               arrested               for               larceny.
               Analysts               and               commentators               thought               of               the               stock               exchange               as               decoupled               from               the               real               economy.

Only               one               tenth               of               the               population               was               invested               -               compared               to               40               percent               today.

"The               World"               wrote,               with               more               than               a               bit               of               Schadenfreude:               "The               country               has               not               suffered               a               catastrophe               ...

The               American               people               ...

has               been               gambling               largely               with               the               surplus               of               its               astonishing               prosperity."
               "The               Daily               News"               concurred:               "The               sagging               of               the               stocks               has               not               destroyed               a               single               factory,               wiped               out               a               single               farm               or               city               lot               or               real               estate               development,               decreased               the               productive               powers               of               a               single               workman               or               machine               in               the               United               States."               In               Louisville,               the               "Herald               Post"               commented               sagely:               "While               Wall               Street               was               getting               rid               of               its               weak               holder               to               their               own               most               drastic               punishment,               grain               was               stronger.

That               will               go               to               the               credit               side               of               the               national               prosperity               and               help               replace               that               buying               power               which               some               fear               has               been               gravely               impaired."
               During               the               Coolidge               presidency,               according               to               the               Encyclopedia               Britannica,               "stock               dividends               rose               by               108               percent,               corporate               profits               by               76               percent,               and               wages               by               33               percent.

In               1929,               4,455,100               passenger               cars               were               sold               by               American               factories,               one               for               every               27               members               of               the               population,               a               record               that               was               not               broken               until               1950.

Productivity               was               the               key               to               America's               economic               growth.

Because               of               improvements               in               technology,               overall               labour               costs               declined               by               nearly               10               percent,               even               though               the               wages               of               individual               workers               rose."
               Jude               Waninski               adds               in               his               tome               "The               Way               the               World               Works"               that               "between               1921               and               1929,               GNP               grew               to               $103.1               billion               from               $69.6               billion.

And               because               prices               were               falling,               real               output               increased               even               faster."               Tax               rates               were               sharply               reduced.
               John               Kenneth               Galbraith               noted               these               data               in               his               seminal               "The               Great               Crash":
               "Between               1925               and               1929,               the               number               of               manufacturing               establishments               increased               from               183,900               to               206,700;               the               value               of               their               output               rose               from               $60.8               billions               to               $68               billions.

The               Federal               Reserve               index               of               industrial               production               which               had               averaged               only               67               in               1921               ...

had               risen               to               110               by               July               1928,               and               it               reached               126               in               June               1929               ...

(but               the               American               people)               were               also               displaying               an               inordinate               desire               to               get               rich               quickly               with               a               minimum               of               physical               effort."
               Personal               borrowing               for               consumption               peaked               in               1928               -               though               the               administration,               unlike               today,               maintained               twin               fiscal               and               current               account               surpluses               and               the               USA               was               a               large               net               creditor.

Charles               Kettering,               head               of               the               research               division               of               General               Motors               described               consumeritis               thus,               just               days               before               the               crash:               "The               key               to               economic               prosperity               is               the               organized               creation               of               dissatisfaction."
               Inequality               skyrocketed.

While               output               per               man-hour               shot               up               by               32               percent               between               1923               and               1929,               wages               crept               up               only               8               percent.

In               1929,               the               top               0.1               percent               of               the               population               earned               as               much               as               the               bottom               42               percent.

Business-friendly               administrations               reduced               by               70               percent               the               exorbitant               taxes               paid               by               those               with               an               income               of               more               than               $1               million.

But               in               the               summer               of               1929,               businesses               reported               sharp               increases               in               inventories.

It               was               the               beginning               of               the               end.
               Were               stocks               overvalued               prior               to               the               crash?

Did               all               stocks               collapse               indiscriminately?

Not               so.

Even               at               the               height               of               the               panic,               investors               remained               conscious               of               real               values.

On               November               3,               1929               the               shares               of               American               Can,               General               Electric,               Westinghouse               and               Anaconda               Copper               were               still               substantially               higher               than               on               March               3,               1928.
               John               Campbell               and               Robert               Shiller,               author               of               "Irrational               Exuberance",               calculated,               in               a               joint               paper               titled               "Valuation               Ratios               and               the               Lon-Run               Market               Outlook:               An               Update"               posted               on               Yale               University'               s               Web               Site,               that               share               prices               divided               by               a               moving               average               of               10               years               worth               of               earnings               reached               28               just               prior               to               the               crash.

Contrast               this               with               45               on               March               2000.
               In               an               NBER               working               paper               published               December               2001               and               tellingly               titled               "The               Stock               Market               Crash               of               1929               -               Irving               Fisher               was               Right",               Ellen               McGrattan               and               Edward               Prescott               boldly               claim:               "We               find               that               the               stock               market               in               1929               did               not               crash               because               the               market               was               overvalued.

In               fact,               the               evidence               strongly               suggests               that               stocks               were               undervalued,               even               at               their               1929               peak."
               According               to               their               detailed               paper,               stocks               were               trading               at               19               times               after-tax               corporate               earning               at               the               peak               in               1929,               a               fraction               of               today's               valuations               even               after               the               recent               correction.

A               March               1999               "Economic               Letter"               published               by               the               Federal               Reserve               Bank               of               San-Francisco               wholeheartedly               concurs.

It               notes               that               at               the               peak,               prices               stood               at               30.5               times               the               dividend               yield,               only               slightly               above               the               long               term               average.
               Contrast               this               with               an               article               published               in               June               1990               issue               of               the               "Journal               of               Economic               History"               by               Robert               Barsky               and               Bradford               De               Long               and               titled               "Bull               and               Bear               Markets               in               the               Twentieth               Century":
               "Major               bull               and               bear               markets               were               driven               by               shifts               in               assessments               of               fundamentals:               investors               had               little               knowledge               of               crucial               factors,               in               particular               the               long               run               dividend               growth               rate,               and               their               changing               expectations               of               average               dividend               growth               plausibly               lie               behind               the               major               swings               of               this               century."
               Jude               Waninski               attributes               the               crash               to               the               disintegration               of               the               pro-free-trade               coalition               in               the               Senate               which               later               led               to               the               notorious               Smoot-Hawley               Tariff               Act               of               1930.

He               traces               all               the               important               moves               in               the               market               between               March               1929               and               June               1930               to               the               intricate               protectionist               danse               macabre               in               Congress.
               This               argument               may               never               be               decided.

Is               a               similar               crash               on               the               cards?

This               cannot               be               ruled               out.

The               1990's               resembled               the               1920's               in               more               than               one               way.

Are               we               ready               for               a               recurrence               of               1929?

About               as               we               were               prepared               in               1928.

Human               nature               -               the               prime               mover               behind               market               meltdowns               -               seemed               not               to               have               changed               that               much               in               these               intervening               seven               decades.
               Will               a               stock               market               crash,               should               it               happen,               be               followed               by               another               "Great               Depression"?

It               depends               which               kind               of               crash.

The               short               term               puncturing               of               a               temporary               bubble               -               e.g.,               in               1962               and               1987               -               is               usually               divorced               from               other               economic               fundamentals.

But               a               major               correction               to               a               lasting               bull               market               invariably               leads               to               recession               or               worse.
               As               the               economist               Hernan               Cortes               Douglas               reminds               us               in               "The               Collapse               of               Wall               Street               and               the               Lessons               of               History"               published               by               the               Friedberg               Mercantile               Group,               this               was               the               sequence               in               London               in               1720               (the               infamous               "South               Sea               Bubble"),               and               in               the               USA               in               1835-40               and               1929-32.






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